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ABSTRACT
Adversarial training is so far the most effective strategy in defending against ad-
versarial examples. However, it suffers from high computational cost due to the
iterative adversarial attacks in each training step. Recent studies show that it is
possible to achieve Fast Adversarial Training by performing a single-step attack
with random initialization. Yet, it remains a mystery why random initialization
helps. Besides, such an approach still lags behind state-of-the-art adversarial train-
ing algorithms on both stability and model robustness. In this work, we develop a
new understanding towards Fast Adversarial Training, by viewing random initial-
ization as performing randomized smoothing for better optimization of the inner
maximization problem. From this perspective, we show that the smoothing ef-
fect by random initialization is not sufficient under the adversarial perturbation
constraint. A new initialization strategy, backward smoothing, is proposed to ad-
dress this issue and significantly improves both stability and model robustness
over single-step robust training methods. Experiments on multiple benchmarks
demonstrate that our method achieves similar model robustness as the original
TRADES method, while using much less training time (∼3x improvement with
the same training schedule).
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks are well known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al.,
2013), i.e., a small perturbation on the original input can lead to misclassification or erroneous
prediction. Many defense methods have been developed to mitigate the disturbance of adversarial
examples (Guo et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018; Ma et al., 2018; Samangouei et al.,
2018; Dhillon et al., 2018; Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019), among which robust training
methods, such as adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) and TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019), are
currently the most effective strategies. Specifically, adversarial training method (Madry et al., 2018)
trains a model on adversarial examples by solving a min-max optimization problem:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B(xi)
L(fθ(x
′
i), yi), (1.1)
where {(xi, yi)}ni=1 is the training dataset, f(·) denotes the logits output of the neural network,B(xi) := {x : ‖x− xi‖∞ ≤ } denotes the -perturbation ball, and L is the cross-entropy loss.
On the other hand, instead of directly training on adversarial examples, TRADES (Zhang et al.,
2019) further improves model robustness with a trade-off between natural accuracy and robust ac-
curacy, by solving the empirical risk minimization problem with a robust regularization term:
min
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
L(fθ(xi), yi) + β max
x′i∈B(xi)
KL
(
s(fθ(xi)), s(fθ(x
′
i))
)]
, (1.2)
where s(·) denotes the softmax function, and β > 0 is a regularization parameter. The goal of
this robust regularization term (i.e., KL divergence term) is to ensure the outputs are stable within
the local neighborhood. Both adversarial training and TRADES achieve good model robustness,
as shown on recent model robustness leaderboards1 (Croce & Hein, 2020b; Chen & Gu, 2020).
1https://github.com/fra31/auto-attack and https://github.com/uclaml/RayS.
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However, a major drawback lies in that both are highly time-consuming for training, limiting their
usefulness in practice. This is largely due to the fact that both methods perform iterative adversarial
attacks (i.e., Projected Gradient Descent) to solve the inner maximization problem in each outer
minimization step.
Recently, Wong et al. (2020) shows that it is possible to use single-step adversarial attacks to solve
the inner maximization problem, which previously was believed impossible. The key ingredient
in their approach is adding a random initialization step before the single-step adversarial attack.
This simple change leads to a reasonably robust model that outperforms other fast robust training
techniques, e.g., Shafahi et al. (2019). However, it remains a mystery why random initialization
is empirically effective. Furthermore, compared to state-of-the-art robust training models (Madry
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019), this approach still lags behind on model robustness.
In this work, we aim to understand the role of random initialization, as well as closing the robustness
gap between adversarial training and Fast Adversarial Training (Fast AT) (Wong et al., 2020). We
propose a new principle towards understanding Fast AT - that random initialization can be viewed as
performing randomized smoothing for better optimization of the inner maximization problem. We
demonstrate that the smoothing effect by random initialization is not sufficient under the adversarial
perturbation constraint. By proposing a new initialization strategy, backward smoothing, which
strengthens the smoothing effect within the -perturbation ball, we present a new fast robust training
method based on TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019). The resulting method significantly improves both
stability and model robustness over the single-step version of TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019), while
consuming much less training time (∼ 3x improvement with the same training schedule).
2 RELATED WORK
There exists a large body of work on adversarial attacks and defenses. In this section, we only review
the most relevant work to ours.
Adversarial Attack The concept of adversarial examples was first proposed in Szegedy et al.
(2013). Since then, many methods have been proposed, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
(Goodfellow et al., 2015), and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al.,
2018). Later on, various attacks (Papernot et al., 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini &
Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020; Croce & Hein, 2020a) were also proposed for
better effectiveness or efficiency. There are also many attacks focused on different attack settings.
Chen et al. (2017) proposed a black-box attack where the gradient is not available, by estimating
the gradient via finite-differences. Various methods (Ilyas et al., 2018; Al-Dujaili & O’Reilly, 2020;
Moon et al., 2019; Andriushchenko et al., 2019) have been developed to improve the query efficiency
of Chen et al. (2017). Other methods (Brendel et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2019; 2020) focused on the
more challenging hard-label attack setting, where only the prediction labels are available. On the
other hand, there is recent work (Croce & Hein, 2020b; Chen & Gu, 2020) that aims to accurately
evaluate the model robustness via ensemble of attacks or effective hard-label attack.
Robust Training Many heuristic defenses (Guo et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018;
Ma et al., 2018; Samangouei et al., 2018; Dhillon et al., 2018) were proposed when the concept of
adversarial examples was first introduced. However, they are later shown by Athalye et al. (2018)
as not truly robust. Adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018) is the first effective method towards
defending against adversarial examples. In Wang et al. (2019), a new convergence quality criterion
was proposed. Zhang et al. (2019) showed the trade-off between natural accuracy and robust ac-
curacy. Wang et al. (2020) proposed to improve model robustness by better utilizing misclassified
examples. Another line of research utilizes extra information (e.g., pre-trained models (Hendrycks
et al., 2019) or extra unlabeled data (Carmon et al., 2019; Alayrac et al., 2019)) to further improve
robustness. Other work focuses on improving training efficiency, such as free adversarial training
from Shafahi et al. (2019) and Fast AT from Wong et al. (2020) using single-step attack (FGSM)
with random initialization. Li et al. (2020) proposed a hybrid approach for improving Fast AT which
is orthogonal to ours. Andriushchenko & Flammarion (2020) proposed a new regularizer promoting
gradient alignment. Yet, it is not focused on closing the robustness gap with state-of-the-arts.
Randomized Smoothing Duchi et al. (2012) proposed the randomized smoothing technique and
proved variance-based convergence rates for non-smooth optimization. Later on, this technique was
applied to certified adversarial defenses (Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) for building robust
2
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models with certified robustness guarantees. In this paper, we are not targeting certified defenses.
Instead, we use the randomized smoothing concept in optimization to explain Fast AT.
3 WHY RANDOM INITIALIZATION HELPS?
We aim to explain why random initialization in Fast AT is effective, and propose a new under-
standing that random initialization can be viewed as performing randomized smoothing on the inner
maximization problem in adversarial training (Madry et al., 2018). Below, we first introduce the
randomized smoothing technique (Duchi et al., 2012) in optimization.
It is well known from optimization theory (Boyd et al., 2004) that non-smooth objectives are gen-
erally harder to optimize compared with smooth objectives. In general, a smoother loss function
allows us to use a larger step size while guaranteeing the convergence of gradient-based algorithms.
Randomized smoothing technique (Duchi et al., 2012) was proposed based on the observation that
random perturbation of the optimization variable can be used to transform the loss into a smoother
one. Instead of using only the gradient at the original iterate, randomized smoothing proposes to ran-
domly generate perturbed iterates and use their gradients for optimization procedure. More details
are provided in Appendix A. Let us recall the inner maximization problem in adversarial training:
max
δ∈B(0)
L(fθ(x+ δ), y). (3.1)
Here, fθ denotes a neural network parameterized by θ. In general, neural networks are non-smooth
due to ReLU activations and pooling layers. This suggests that (3.1) can be difficult to solve, and
using gradient descent with large step size can lead to divergence in the maximization problem. It
also explains why directly using single-step projected gradient ascent without random initialization
fails (Wong et al., 2020). Now, let us apply randomized smoothing to (3.1):
max
δ∈B(0)
Eξ∼U(−1,1)L(fθ(x+ δ + ξ), y), (3.2)
where ξ is the perturbation vector for randomized smoothing, and δ is the perturbation vector for
later gradient update step (initialized as zero). Suppose we solve (3.2) in a stochastic fashion (i.e.,
sample a random perturbation ξ instead of computing the expectation over ξ), and using only one
step gradient update. We can see that this reduces to the Fast AT formulation. This suggests that Fast
AT can be viewed as performing stochastic single-step attacks on a randomized smoothed objective
function which allows using larger step size. This explains why random initialization helps Fast AT
as it makes the loss objective smoother and thus easier to optimize.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
4.1 DRAWBACKS OF THE RANDOM INITIALIZATION STRATEGY
Although Fast AT achieves much faster robust training compared with standard adversarial training
(Madry et al., 2018), it exposes several major weaknesses. For demonstration, we exclude the ad-
ditional acceleration techniques introduced in Wong et al. (2020) for accelerating the training speed
(e.g., mix-precision training, cyclic learning rate), and instead apply standard piecewise learning
rate decay used in Madry et al. (2018); Zhang et al. (2019) with the decay point set at the 50-th and
75-th epochs.
Performance Stability As observed in Li et al. (2020), Fast AT can be highly unstable (i.e., large
variance in robust performance) when using traditional piecewise learning rate decay schedule. We
argue that this is because Wong et al. (2020) utilized a drastically large attack step size (10/255,
even larger than the perturbation limit ), which causes unstable training behavior.
To validate this, we run Fast AT on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18 model (He et al., 2016) for 10
times with different step sizes. Note that we adopt early-stopping and record the best-performing
model among 100 epochs. As shown in Figure 1, although the single-best robustness performance
is obtained by using step size 10/255, the variance is very high. Moreover, most trials lead to weak
robust performance with a low average and median robust accuracy. On the other hand, we observe
that when using step size 8/255, model robustness is more stable and higher on average. Note that
using a too small step size would by nature hurt model robustness. These observations suggest that
Fast AT cannot achieve the best performance on robust performance and stability simultaneously.
Potential for Robustness Improvement Fast AT uses standard adversarial training (Madry et al.,
2018) as the baseline, and can obtain similar robustness performance. However, later work (Rice
3
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Table 1: Model robustness comparison among
Fast Adversarial Training, Adversarial Train-
ing, and TRADES, using ResNet-18 model on
CIFAR-10 dataset.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%)
Fast AT (avg. over 10 runs) 84.58 44.52
Fast AT (best over 10 runs) 84.79 46.30
AT (early-stop) 82.36 51.14
TRADES 82.33 52.74
step size=10/255 step size=8/255 step size=7/255
Fast AT
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43.08
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Mean
Figure 1: Comparison of Fast Adversarial
Training performance with different step sizes.
et al., 2020) shows that adversarial training can cause the overfitting problem, while early stopping
can largely improve robustness. Zhang et al. (2019) further achieves even better model robustness
that is much higher than what Fast AT obtains. From Table 1, we observe that there exists an 8%
robust accuracy gap between Fast AT (average over 10 runs) and the best-performing TRADES
model. Even for the best out of 10 trials, there is still a 6% gap. This indicates that Fast AT is still
far from optimal, and there is still big room for further robustness improvement.
4.2 A NAIVE TRY: RANDOMIZED SMOOTHING FOR TRADES
As shown in Table 1, TRADES enjoys better model robustness compared with standard adversarial
training. A naive attempt is to apply randomized smoothing to TRADES and see if this leads to
better robustness than Fast AT. Let us recall the inner maximization formulation for TRADES:
max
δ∈B(0)
KL
(
s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x+ δ))
)
. (4.1)
Similarly, we can smooth this objective and solve the following objective instead:
max
δ∈B(0)
Eξ∼U(−1,1)KL
(
s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x+ δ + ξ))
)
. (4.2)
This leads to the same adversarial example formulation as using random initialization and then
performing single-step projected gradient ascent. We refer to this strategy as Fast TRADES.
step size=10/255 step size=8/255 step size=7/255
Fast TRADES
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Figure 2: Comparison of Fast TRADES perfor-
mance under different step sizes.
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Figure 3: KL divergence value comparison
against training epochs.
We experiment with Fast TRADES using different step sizes, and find that its performance is sensi-
tive to step size, similar to Fast AT. As shown in Figure 2, using a step size of 10/255 also leads to
very low average and median robust accuracy. We notice that reducing the step size to 7/255 yields
better on-average robustness, which is slightly higher than the average of Fast AT. However, in terms
of the best-run’s performance, there is no significant gain over Fast AT. This suggests that directly
applying randomized smoothing to TRADES does not lead to major improvement.
Recall the results from Section 4.1. Applying overly-large step size in Fast AT and Fast TRADES
can lead to unstable training with deteriorated robustness. This suggests that the randomized smooth-
ing effect might not be strong enough (i.e., the objective function is not smooth enough) to enable
the use of a larger step size. However, unlike the general randomized smoothing setting, one of the
special constraints in the adversarial setting is that random perturbation on the input vector is subject
to the -ball constraint, therefore cannot be too large. This means that we cannot further increase the
smoothing effect by simply using larger random perturbations.
4
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To further validate the claim that the current smoothing effect is not sufficient, we carefully study the
changes made by randomized smoothing. Figure 3 shows the KL-divergence between original logits
and logits after random initialization, i.e., KL(s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x + ξ))), as well as KL-divergence
between original logits and logits after both random initialization and adversarial perturbation, i.e.,
KL(s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x + δ + ξ))). We can see that the KL-divergence after random initialization
is negligible compared with that of adversarial perturbation. In fact, it is nearly zero almost all
the time, suggesting that the network output at random perturbation point is almost the same as
that at the original point. This further suggests that the current smoothing effect by using random
initialization is not sufficient, which motivates us to consider how to further boost the smoothing
effect within the -perturbation ball.
4.3 BACKWARD SMOOTHING
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Figure 4: A sketch of our proposed method.
Now we introduce our proposed method to ad-
dress the above issue. The goal is to fur-
ther boost the smoothing effect of randomized
smoothing without violating the -perturbation
constraint. Note that if we are allowed to
use larger random perturbations, we expect that
KL(s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x+ uξ))) will also be larger,
meaning that the neural network output of the
random initialization fθ(x+ uξ) should be more
different from the original output fθ(x) (as
shown in Figure 4). This inspires us to gener-
ate the initialization point in a backward fash-
ion. Specifically, let us denote the input domain
x ∈ Rd as the input space, and their correspond-
ing neural network output fθ(x) ∈ Rc as the out-
put space, where c is the number of classes for
the classifier. We first generate random points in
the output space just as randomized smoothing
does in the input space, i.e., fθ(x) + γψ, where
ψ ∼ U(−1, 1) is the random variable and γ is
a small number. Then we find the corresponding
input perturbation in a backward fashion and use it as our initialization. An illustrative sketch of our
proposed method is provided in Figure 4.
Now we formalize our proposed method in mathematical language. The key step in our proposed
method is to find the input perturbation ξ such that:
fθ(x+ ξ) = fθ(x) + γψ. (4.3)
In order to find the best ξ∗ to satisfy (4.3), we turn to solve the following problem:
ξ∗ = argmin
ξ∈B(0)
KL
(
s(fθ(x) + γψ), s(fθ(x+ ξ))
)
. (4.4)
For the sake of computational efficiency, we solve (4.4) using single-step PGD in practice. Then,
similar to Wong et al. (2020), we use single-step gradient update for the inner maximization problem:
δ∗ = argmax
δ∈B(0)
KL
(
s(fθ(x)), s(fθ(x+ δ + ξ
∗))
)
. (4.5)
Finally, we update the neural network parameter θ using stochastic gradients at the adversarial point
x + ξ∗ + δ∗. A summary of our proposed algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Note that the
proposed Backward Smoothing seems also compatible with Adversarial Training. However, Adver-
sarial Training does not contain terms using KL divergence loss, which may hinder its performance.
We will show this empirically in Section 5.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of our proposed method. We first compare
our proposed method with other robust training baselines on CIFAR-10, CIFAR100 (Krizhevsky
5
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Algorithm 1 Backward Smoothing
1: input: The number of training iterations T , number of adversarial perturbation steps K, maxi-
mum perturbation strength , training step size η, adversarial perturbation step size α, regular-
ization parameter β > 0;
2: Random initialize model parameter θ0
3: for t = 1, . . . , T do
4: Sample mini-batch {xi, yi}mi=1 from training set
5: Obtain ξ∗ by solving (4.4)
6: Obtain δ∗ by solving (4.5)
7: θt = θt−1 − η/m ·
∑m
i=1∇θ
[
L(fθ(xi), yi) + β · KL
(
s(fθ(xi)), s(fθ(xi + ξ
∗ + δ∗))
)]
8: end for
et al., 2009) and Tiny ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009)2 datasets. We also provide multiple ablation
studies as well as robustness evaluation with state-of-the-art adversarial attack methods to validate
that our proposed method provides effective robustness improvement.
5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
Following previous work on robust training (Madry et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019; Wong et al.,
2020), we set  = 0.031 for all three datasets. In terms of model architecture, we adopt standard
ResNet-18 model (He et al., 2016) for both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets, and ResNet-50
model for Tiny ImageNet. We follow the standard piecewise learning rate decay schedule as used
in Madry et al. (2018); Zhang et al. (2019) and set decaying point at 50-th and 75-th epochs. The
starting learning rate for all methods are set to 0.1, the same as previous work (Madry et al., 2018;
Zhang et al., 2019). For Adversarial Training and TRADES methods, we adopt 10-step iterative
PGD attack with step size 2/255 for both. For TRADES, we adopt β = 6 as reported in their
original paper for the best performance. For our proposed method, we set the backward smoothing
parameter γ = 1, β = 10 and attack step size as . For robust accuracy evaluation, we typically
adopt 100-step PGD attack with step size 2/255. To ensure the validity of the model robustness
improvement is not because of the obfuscated gradient (Athalye et al., 2018), we further test our
method with current state-of-the-art attacks (Croce & Hein, 2020b; Chen & Gu, 2020).
5.2 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH ROBUST TRAINING BASELINES
We compare the adversarial robustness of Backward Smoothing against standard Adversarial Train-
ing (Madry et al., 2018), TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019), as well as fast training methods such as
Fast AT (Wong et al., 2020) and our naive baseline Fast TRADES. We also compare with recently
proposed Fast AT+ method (Li et al., 2020) that achieves high robustness with reduced training
time.3 Since our proposed backward smoothing initialization utilizes an extra step of gradient back-
propagation, we also compare with Fast TRADES using 2-step attack for fair comparison.
Table 2: Performance comparison on CIFAR-10
using ResNet-18 model.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%) Time (m)
AT 82.36 51.14 430
Fast AT 84.79 46.30 82
TRADES 82.33 52.74 482
Fast TRADES 84.80 46.25 126
Fast TRADES (2-step) 83.46 48.08 164
Backward Smoothing 82.38 52.50 164
Table 3: Performance comparison on CIFAR-
100 using ResNet-18 model.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%) Time (m)
AT 55.22 28.53 428
Fast AT 60.35 24.64 83
TRADES 56.99 29.41 480
Fast TRADES 60.22 19.40 126
Fast TRADES (2-step) 58.53 23.87 165
Backward Smoothing 56.96 30.50 164
Table 2 shows the performance comparison on the CIFAR-10 dataset using ResNet-18 model. Our
Backward Smoothing method significantly closes the robustness gap between state-of-the-art ro-
bust training methods, achieving high robust accuracy that is almost as good as TRADES, while
consuming much less (∼ 3x) training time. Compared with Fast AT, Backward Smoothing typi-
cally costs twice the training time, yet achieving significantly higher model robustness. Our method
2We do not test on ImageNet dataset mainly due to that TRADES does not perform well on ImageNet as
mentioned in Qin et al. (2019).
3Since Li et al. (2020) does not have code released yet, we only compare with theirs in the same setting
(combined with acceleration techniques) using reported numbers.
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also achieves similar performance gain against Fast TRADES. Note that even compared with Fast
TRADES using 2-step attack, which costs about the same training time as ours, our method still
achieves a nearly 4% improvement.
Table 4: Performance comparison on Tiny Ima-
geNet dataset using ResNet-50 model.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%) Time (m)
AT 44.50 21.34 2666
Fast AT 49.58 18.56 575
TRADES 47.02 21.04 2928
Fast TRADES 49.20 15.50 805
Fast TRADES (2-step) 46.40 18.20 1045
Backward Smoothing 46.68 22.32 1035
Table 3 shows the performance comparison on
CIFAR-100 using ResNet-18 model. We can
observe patterns similar to CIFAR-10 experi-
ments. Backward Smoothing achieves slightly
higher robustness compared with TRADES,
while costing much less training time. Com-
pared with Fast TRADES using 2-step attack,
our method achieves a 5% robustness improve-
ment with roughly the same training cost. Table
4 shows that on Tiny ImageNet using ResNet-
50 model, Backward Smoothing also achieves
significant robustness improvement over other single-step robust training methods and even outper-
forms the state-of-the-art robust training methods.
5.3 EVALUATION WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART ATTACKS
To ensure that Backward Smoothing does not cause obfuscated gradient problem (Athalye et al.,
2018) or presents a false sense of security, we further evaluate our method using state-of-the-art at-
tacks, by considering two evaluation methods: (i) AutoAttack (Croce & Hein, 2020b), which is an
ensemble of four diverse (white-box and black-box) attacks (APGD-CE, APGD-DLR, FAB (Croce
& Hein, 2020a) and Square Attack (Andriushchenko et al., 2019)) to reliably evaluate robustness;
(ii) RayS attack (Chen & Gu, 2020), which only requires the prediction labels of the target model
(completely gradient-free) and is able to detect falsely robust models. It also measures another ro-
bustness metric, average decision boundary distance (ADBD), defined as examples’ average distance
to their closest decision boundary. ADBD reflects the overall model robustness beyond  constraint.
Both evaluations provide online robustness leaderboards for public comparison with other models.
We train our method with WideResNet-34-10 model (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) and evaluate
via AutoAttack and RayS. Table 5 shows that under state-of-the-art attacks, Backward Smoothing
still holds high robustness comparable to TRADES. Specifically, in terms of robust accuracy, Back-
ward Smoothing is only 2% behind TRADES, while significantly higher than AT (Madry et al.,
2018) and Fast AT (Wong et al., 2020). In terms of ADBD metric, Backward Smoothing achieves
the same level of overall model robustness as TRADES, much higher than the other two methods.
Table 5: Performance comparison with state-of-the-
art robust models on CIFAR-10 evaluated by Au-
toAttack and RayS.
Method AutoAttack RayS
Metric Rob (%) Rob (%) ADBD
AT 44.04 50.70 0.0344
Fast AT 43.21 50.10 0.0334
TRADES 53.08 57.30 0.0403
Backward Smoothing 51.13 55.08 0.0403
Fast AT Fast TRADES Backward Smoothing
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Figure 5: Robustness stability of different
fast robust training methods.
5.4 STABILITY AND COMPATIBILITY
Figure 5 shows that Backward Smoothing is much more stable than single-step robust training meth-
ods. Compared with Fast AT and Fast TRADES, Backward Smoothing has much smaller variance
while maintaining much higher average model robustness. This demonstrates the superiority on ro-
bustness stability for Backward Smoothing method. We also wonder whether Backward Smoothing
is compatible with Adversarial Training, i.e., can we use a similar initialization strategy for improv-
ing Fast AT? We test this on CIFAR-10 using ResNet-18 model, and the resulting model achieves
45.53±0.35% robust accuracy, improving the stability of Fast AT as well as the average robustness.
However, the best run out of 10 trials does not achieve better robustness. We conjecture that the
main reason for the deteriorated performance is the different choices of inner maximization loss for
7
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Adversarial Training (Cross-Entropy) and TRADES (KL divergence). Considering the random per-
turbation generated on the output space, the Cross-Entropy loss mainly focuses on the y-logit while
KL divergence is closely related to all logits. This partially explains the above observations.
5.5 ABLATION STUDIES
We also perform a set of ablation studies to provide a more in-depth analysis on Backward Smooth-
ing. Due to the space limit, here we present the sensitivity analysis on smoothing parameter γ and
the step size, and leave more ablation studies in the supplemental materials.
Effect of γ: We analyze the effect of γ in Backward Smoothing by fixing β and the attack step
size. Table 6 summarizes the results. In general, γ does not have a significant effect on the final
model robustness; however, using too large or too small γ would lead to slightly worse robustness.
Empirically, γ = 1 achieves the best performance on both datasets.
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis of γ on the CIFAR-
10 and CIFAR-100 datasets using ResNet-18
model.
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
γ Nat (%) Rob (%) Nat (%) Rob (%)
0.1 82.43 52.13 56.62 29.34
0.5 82.53 52.34 56.95 29.85
1.0 82.38 52.50 56.96 30.50
2.0 82.29 52.42 56.16 29.88
5.0 81.50 52.32 56.10 429.83
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis of the attack step
size on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets
using ResNet-18 model.
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Step Size Nat (%) Rob (%) Nat (%) Rob (%)
6/255 81.38 52.38 56.83 29.78
7/255 81.96 52.40 56.61 29.82
8/255 82.38 52.50 56.96 30.50
9/255 82.47 52.16 56.45 29.35
10/255 81.71 52.04 60.85 24.21
11/255 67.43 42.45 40.40 20.92
12/255 65.56 41.12 37.90 18.83
Effect of Attack Step Size: To verify the effect of attack step size, we fix γ and β. From Table 7, we
can observe that different from single-step robust training methods, Backward Smoothing achieves
similar robustness with slightly smaller step size, while the best performance is obtained with step
size 8/255. This suggests that we do not need to pursue overly-large step size for better robustness
as in Fast AT. This avoids the stability issue in Fast AT.
5.6 COMBINING WITH OTHER ACCELERATION TECHNIQUES
Table 8: Performance comparison on CIFAR-
10 using ResNet-18 model combined with cyclic
learning rate and mix-precision training.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%) Time (m)
AT 81.48 50.32 62
Fast AT 83.26 45.30 12
Fast AT+ 83.54 48.43 28
TRADES 79.64 50.86 88
Fast TRADES 85.14 44.98 18
Fast TRADES (2-step) 81.44 47.10 24
Backward Smoothing 78.76 50.58 24
Aside from random initialization, Wong et al.
(2020) also adopts two additional accelera-
tion techniques to further improve training ef-
ficiency with a minor sacrifice on robustness
performance: cyclic learning rate decay sched-
ule (Smith, 2017) and mix-precision training
(Micikevicius et al., 2017). We show that
such strategies are also applicable to Backward
Smoothing. Table 8 provides the results when
these acceleration techniques are applied. We
can observe that both work universally well
for all methods, significantly reducing train-
ing time (in comparison with Table 2). Yet it
does not alter the conclusions that Backward
Smoothing achieves similar robustness to TRADES with much less training time. Also when com-
pared with the recent proposed Fast AT+ method, Backward Smoothing achieves higher robustness
and training efficiency. Note that the idea of Fast AT+ method is orthogonal to ours and we can also
adopt such hybrid approach for further reduction on training time.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a new understanding towards Fast Adversarial Training by viewing ran-
dom initialization as performing randomized smoothing for the inner maximization problem. We
then show that the smoothing effect by random initialization is not enough under adversarial pertur-
bation constraint. To address this issue, we propose a new initialization strategy, Backward Smooth-
ing. The resulting method closes the robustness gap to state-of-the-art robust training methods and
significantly improves model robustness over single-step robust training methods.
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A RANDOMIZED SMOOTHING
Randomized smoothing technique (Duchi et al., 2012) was originally proposed for solving convex
non-smooth optimization problems. It is based on the observations that random perturbation of the
optimization variable can be used to transform the loss into a smoother one. Instead of using only
L(x) and ∇L(x) to solve
minL(x),
randomized smoothing turns to solve the following objective function, which utilizes more global
information from neighboring areas:
minEξ∼U(−1,1)L(x+ uξ), (A.1)
where ξ is a random variable, and u is a small number. Duchi et al. (2012) showed that randomized
smoothing makes the loss in (A.1) smoother than before. Hence, even if the original loss L is
non-smooth, it can still be solved by stochastic gradient descent with provable guarantees.
B ADDITIONAL ABLATION STUDIES
In this section, we conduct additional ablation studies to provide a comprehensive view to the Back-
ward Smoothing method.
B.1 THE EFFECT OF β
We conduct the ablation studies to figure out the effect of β in Backward Smoothing method by
fixing γ and the attack step size. Table 9 shows the experimental results. Similar to what β does in
TRADES (Zhang et al., 2019), here in Backward Smoothing, β still controls the trade-off between
natural accuracy and robust accuracy. We observe that with a larger β, natural accuracy keeps
decreasing and the best robustness is obtained with β = 10.0.
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis of β on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets using ResNet-18 model.
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
β Nat (%) Rob (%) Nat (%) Rob (%)
2.0 84.87 46.46 62.22 24.83
4.0 84.58 50.01 59.03 27.58
6.0 83.96 51.65 57.46 28.66
8.0 82.48 51.88 57.51 29.38
10.0 82.38 52.50 56.96 30.50
12.0 81.63 52.38 56.46 29.95
B.2 DOES BACKWARD SMOOTHING ALONE WORKS?
To further understand the role of Backward Smoothing in robust training, we conduct experiments
on using Backward Smoothing alone, i.e., only use Backward Smoothing initialization but do not
perform gradient-based attack at all. Table 10 and Table 11 show the experimental results. We can
observe that Backward Smoothing as an initialization itself only provides a limited level of robust-
ness (not as good as single-step attack). This is reasonable since the loss for Backward Smoothing
does not directly promote adversarial attacks. Therefore it only serves as an initialization to help
single-step attacks better solve the inner maximization problems.
Table 10: Performance of using Backward
Smoothing alone on CIFAR-10 dataset using
ResNet-18 model.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%)
Fast AT 84.79 46.30
Fast TRADES 84.80 46.25
Backward Smoothing Alone 69.87 39.26
Table 11: Performance of using Backward
Smoothing alone on CIFAR-100 dataset using
ResNet-18 model.
Method Nat (%) Rob (%)
Fast AT 60.35 24.64
Fast TRADES 60.22 19.40
Backward Smoothing Alone 43.47 18.51
12
